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Abstract
Recommendation systems and content filtering approaches based on annotations and ratings, essentially rely
on users expressing their preferences and interests through their actions, in order to provide personalised
content. This activity, in which users engage collectively has been named social tagging, and it is one of
the most popular in which users engage online, and although it has opened new possibilities for application
interoperability on the semantic web, it is also posing new privacy threats. It, in fact, consists of describing
online or oﬄine resources by using free-text labels (i.e. tags), therefore exposing the user profile and activity
to privacy attacks. Users, as a result, may wish to adopt a privacy-enhancing strategy in order not to
reveal their interests completely. Tag forgery is a privacy enhancing technology consisting of generating
tags for categories or resources that do not reflect the user’s actual preferences. By modifying their profile,
tag forgery may have a negative impact on the quality of the recommendation system, thus protecting
user privacy to a certain extent but at the expenses of utility loss. The impact of tag forgery on content-
based recommendation is, therefore, investigated in a real-world application scenario where different forgery
strategies are evaluated, and the consequent loss in utility is measured and compared.
Keywords: Information Privacy; Privacy-enhancing technology; Privacy Risk; Recommendation system;
Social Web; Collaborative tagging; Tag forgery.
1. Introduction
Recommendation and information filtering systems have been developed to predict users’ preferences, and
eventually use the resulting predictions for a variety of services, from search engines to resources suggestions
and advertisement. The system functionality relies on users implicitly or explicitly revealing their activity
and personal preferences, which are ultimately used to generate personalised recommendations.
Such annotation activity has been called social tagging and it consists of users collectively assigning
keywords (i.e. tags) to real life objects and web-based resources that they find interesting. Social tagging
is currently one of the most popular online activities. Therefore, different functionalities have been imple-
mented in various online services, such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram, to encourage their
users to tag resources collectively.
Tagging involves classifying resources according to one’s experience. Unlike traditional methods where
classification happens by choosing labels from a controlled vocabulary, in social tagging systems users freely
choose and combine terms. This is usually referred to as free-form tag annotation, and the resulting emergent
information organisation has been called folksonomy.
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This scenario has opened new possibilities for semantic interoperability in web applications. Tags, in
fact, allow autonomous agents to categorise web resources easily, obtaining some form of semantic repre-
sentation of their content. However, annotating online resources poses potential privacy risks, since users
reveal their preferences, interests and activities. They may then wish to adopt privacy-enhancing strategies,
masquerading their real interests to a certain extent, by applying tags to categories or resources that do not
reflect their actual preferences. Specifically, Tag forgery is a privacy enhancing technology (PET) designed
to protect user privacy, by creating bogus tags in order to disguise real user’s interests. As a perturbation-
based mechanism, tag forgery poses an inherent trade-off between privacy and usability. Users are able to
obtain a high level of protection by increasing their forgery activity, but this can substantially affect the
quality of the recommendation.
The primary goal of this work is to investigate the effects of tag forgery to content-based recommendation
in a real-world application scenario, studying the interplay between the degree of privacy and the potential
degradation of the quality of the recommendation. An experimental evaluation is performed on a dataset
extracted from Delicious [1], a social bookmarking platform for web resources. In particular, three different
tag forgery strategies have been evaluated, namely: optimised tag forgery [2], uniform tag forgery and
TrackMeNot (TMN) [3], the last consists of simulating a possible TMN like agent, periodically issuing
randomised tags according to popular categories.
Using the dataset and a measure of utility for the recommendation system, a threefold experiment is
conducted to evaluate how the application of tag forgery may affect the quality of the recommender. Hence,
we simulate a scenario in which users only apply one of the different tag forgery strategies considered.
Measures of the recommender performances are computed before and after the application of each PET,
obtaining an experimental study of the compromise between privacy and utility.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic evaluation of the impact of applying perturbation-
based privacy technologies on the usability of content-based recommendation systems. For this evaluation,
both suitable privacy and usability metrics are required. In particular, as suggested by Parra et al. [4],
the KL divergence is used as privacy metric of the user profile; while the quality of the recommendation is
computed following the methodology proposed by Cantador el al. [5].
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the state of the art. Section 3 describes the
adversary model considered. Section 4 explains a possible practical application of the proposed PET through
the implementation of a communication module. Section 5 discusses the evaluation methodology and ob-
tained results. Section 6 presents the conclusions that can be derived from the presented results, while also
introducing future research lines.
2. State of The Art
In recommendation systems employing tags or in any system allowing resource annotation, users decide to
disclose personal data in order to receive, in exchange, a certain benefit. This earned value can be quantified
in terms of the customised experience of a certain product [6].For such a recommendation system to work,
and successfully propose items of interest, user preferences need to be revealed and made accessible partially
or in full, and thus exposed to possible privacy attacks.
When a user expresses and shares their interests by annotating a set of items, these resources and their
categorisation will be part of their activity. The recorded users’ activities will allow the used platform to
“know more” about each of them, and therefore suggesting over time useful resources. These could be items
similar to others tagged in the past, or simply close to the set of preferences expressed in their profile. In
order to protect their privacy, a user could refrain from expressing their preferences altogether. While in this
case an attacker would not be able to build a profile of the user in question, it would also become impossible
for the service provider to deliver a personalised experience: the user would then achieve the maximum level
of privacy protection, but also the worst level of utility.
Various and numerous approaches have been proposed to protect user privacy by also preserving the
recommendation utility in the context of social tagging platform. These approaches can be grouped around
four main strategies [7]: encryption-based methods, approaches based on trusted third parties (TTPs),
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collaborative mechanisms and data-perturbative techniques. In traditional approaches to privacy, users
or application designers decide whether certain sensitive information is to be disclosed or not. While the
unavailability of this data, traditionally attained by means of access control or encryption, produces the
highest level of privacy, it would also limit access to particular content or functionalities. This would be the
case of a user freely annotating items on a social tagging platform. By adopting traditional PETs, the profile
of this user could be made available only to the service providers, but kept completely or partially hidden
from their network of social connections on the platform. This approach would indeed limit the chances of
an attacker profiling the user, but would, unfortunately, prevent them from receiving content suggested by
their community.
A conceptually simple approach to protecting user privacy consists in a TTP acting as an intermediary
or anonymiser between the user and an untrusted information system. In this scenario, the system cannot
know the user ID, but merely the identity of the TTP involved in the communication. Alternatively, the
TTP may act as a pseudonymiser by supplying a pseudonym ID’ to the service provider, but only the TTP
knows the correspondence between the pseudonym ID’ and the actual user ID. In online social networks, the
use of either approach would not be entirely feasible as users of these networks are required to authenticate
to login. Although the adoption of TTPs in the manner described must, therefore, be ruled out, the users
could provide a pseudonym at the sign-up process. In this regard, some sites have started offering social-
networking services where users are not required to reveal their real identifiers. Social Number [8] is an
example of such networks, where users must choose a unique number as their ID.
Unfortunately, none of these approaches effectively prevents an attacker from profiling a user based on
the annotated items content, and ultimately inferring their real identity. This could be accomplished in
the case of a user posting related content across different platforms, making them vulnerable to techniques
based on the ideas of reidentification. As an example, suppose that an observer has access to certain
behavioural patterns of online activity associated with a user, who occasionally discloses their ID, possibly
during interactions not involving sensitive data. The same user could attempt to hide under a pseudonym
ID’ to exchange information of confidential nature. Nevertheless, if the user exhibited similar behavioural
patterns, the unlinkability between ID and ID’ could be compromised through the exploitable similarity
between these patterns. In this case, any past profiling inferences carried out by the pseudonym ID’ would
be linked to the actual user ID.
A particularly rich group of PETs resort to users collaborating to protect their privacy. One of the most
popular is Crowds [9], which assumes that a set of users wanting to browse the Web may collaborate to
submit their requests. Precisely, a user wishing to send a request to a Web server selects first a member of
the group at random, and then forwards the request to them. When this member receives the request, it
flips a biased coin to determine whether to forward this request to another member or to submit it directly
to the Web server. This process is repeated until the request is finally relayed to the intended destination.
As a result of this probabilistic protocol, the Web server and any of the members forwarding the request
cannot ascertain the identity of the actual sender, that is, the member who initiated the request.
We consider collaborative protocols [10, 11, 12] like Crowds, not suitable for the application addressed
in this work although they may be effective in applications such as information retrieval and Web search.
The main reason is that users are required to be logged into online social tagging platforms. That is, users
participating in a collaborative protocol would need the credentials of their peers to log in, and post on
their behalf, which in practice would be unacceptable. Besides, even if users were willing to share their
credentials, this would not entirely avoid profiling based on the observation of the resources annotated.
In the case of perturbative methods for recommendation systems, [13] proposes that users add random
values to their ratings and then submit these perturbed ratings to the recommender. When the system
has received these ratings, it executes an algorithm and sends the users some information that allows them
to compute the final prediction themselves. When the number of participating users is sufficiently large,
the authors find that user privacy is protected to some degree, and the system reaches an acceptable level
of accuracy. However, even though a user may disguise all their ratings, merely showing interest in an
individual item may be just as revealing as the score assigned to that item. For instance, a user rating a
book called “How to Overcome Depression” indicates a clear interest in depression, regardless of the score
assigned to this book. Apart from this critique, other works [14, 15] stress that the use of certain randomised
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data-distortion techniques might not be able to preserve privacy completely in the long run.
In line with these two latter works, [16] applies the same perturbative technique to collaborative filtering
algorithms based on singular-value decomposition, focusing on the impact that their technique has on
privacy. For this purpose, they use the privacy metric proposed by Agrawal, and Aggarwal, [17], effectively
a normalized version of the mutual information between the original and the perturbed data, and conduct
some experiments with data sets from Movielens [18] and Jester [19]. The results show the trade-off curve
between accuracy in recommendations and privacy. In particular, they measure accuracy as the mean
absolute error between the predicted values from the original ratings and the predictions obtained from the
perturbed ratings.
The approach considered in this study follows the idea of perturbing the information implicitly or ex-
plicitly disclosed by the user. It, therefore, represents a possible alternative to hinder an attacker in their
efforts to profile their activity precisely, when using a personalised service. The submission of false user
data, together with genuine data, is an illustrative example of data-perturbative mechanism. In the context
of information retrieval, query forgery [2] prevents privacy attackers from profiling users accurately based on
the content of queries, without having to trust the service provider or the network operator, but obviously
at the cost of traffic overhead. In this kind of mechanisms, the perturbation itself typically takes place on
the user side. This means that users do not need to trust any external entity such as the recommender, the
ISP or their neighbouring peers. Naturally, this does not signify that data perturbation cannot be used in
combination with other third-party based approaches or mechanisms relying on user collaboration.
Certainly, the distortion of user profiles for privacy protection may be done not only by means of the
insertion of false activity, but also by suppression. An example of this latter kind of data perturbation
may be found in Parra et al. [20], where the authors propose the elimination of tags as a privacy-enhancing
strategy in the context of the semantic Web. This strategy allows users to preserve their privacy to a
certain degree, but it comes at the cost of a degradation in the semantic functionality of the Web. Precisely,
Parra et al. [21] investigates mathematically the privacy-utility trade-off posed by the suppression of tags,
measuring privacy as the Shannon entropy of the perturbed profile, and utility as the percentage of tags
users are willing to eliminate. Closely related to this work is also another study of Parra et al. [22], where
the impact of tag suppression is assessed experimentally in the context of a parental control application, in
terms of percentages regarding missing tags on resources on the one hand, and in terms of false positives
and negatives on the other.
3. Adversary Model
Users tagging online and oﬄine resources generate what is has been called a folksonomy, that is, a set
composed by all the users that have expressed at least a tag, the tags that have been used and the items that
have been described through them. Formally, a folksonomy F can be defined as a tuple F = {T ,U , I,A},
where T = {t1, . . . , tL} is the set of tags, or more generally tag categories, which comprise the vocabulary
expressed by the folksonomy; U = {u1, . . . , uM} is the set of users that have expressed at least a tag;
I = {i1, . . . , iN} is the set of items that have been tagged; and A = {(um, tl, in) ∈ U × T × I} is the set of
annotations of each tag category tl to an item in by a user um [5].
As we shall see in Section 3.1, our user-profile model will rely on categorising tags into categories of
interest. This will provide a certain mathematical tractability of the user profile while at the same time
allowing for a classification of the user interests into macro semantic topics.
In our scenario; users assign tags to online resources, according to their preferences, taste or needs. It
follows that while the user is contributing to categorise a specific content through their tags, hence adding
semantic information to the whole folksonomy, their activity is revealing something regarding their interests,
reducing their privacy overall.
We assume that the set of potential privacy attackers includes any entity capable of capturing the
information users convey to a social tagging platform. Accordingly, both service providers and network
operators are deemed potential attackers. However, since tags are often publicly available to other users
of the tagging platform, any entity able to collect this information is also taken into consideration in our
adversary model.
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(a) Example of user profile expressed as a PMF across a set of
tag categories.
Reference Computers Society Science Arts Health Recreation Home Business Sports Games
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
R
el
at
iv
e 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 O
cc
ur
en
ce
 [%
]
(b) Profile of the whole population of users in our dataset.
Figure 1: We model user and item profiles as normalised histograms of tags across a set of predefined categories of interest.
In our model, we suppose that the privacy attacker aims at profiling users through their expressed
preferences, specifically on the basis of the tags posted. Throughout this work, we shall consider that the
objective of this profiling activity is to individuate users, meaning that the attacker wishes to find users
whose preferences significantly diverge from the interests of the whole population of users. This assumption
is in line with other works in the literature [4, 23, 24].
3.1. Modelling the User/Item Profiles
A tractable model of the user profile as a probability mass function (PMF) is proposed in [20, 21, 22, 23]
to express how each tag contributes to expose how many times the user has expressed a preference toward
a specific category of interest. This model follows the intuitive assumption that a particular category is
weighted according to the number of times this has been used in the user or item profile.
Exactly as in those works, we define the profile of a user um as the PMF pm = (pm,1, . . . , pm,L),
conceptually a histogram of relative frequencies of tags across the set of tag categories T . More formally, in
terms of the notation introduced at the beginning of Section 3, the l-th component of such profile is defined
as
pm,l =
|{(um, tl, i) ∈ A|i ∈ I}|
|{(um, t, i) ∈ A|t ∈ T , i ∈ I}| .
Similarly, we define the profile of an item in as the PMF qn = (qn,1, . . . , qn,L), where qn,l is the percentage
of tags belonging to the category l which have been assigned to this item. Both user and item profiles can
then be seen as normalised histograms of tags across categories of interest. Our profile model is in this
extent equivalent to the tag clouds that numerous collaborative tagging services use to visualise which tags
are being posted, collaboratively or individually by each user. A tag cloud, similarly to a histogram, is a
visual representation in which tags are weighted according to their relevance. Figure 1a shows an example
of user profile.
In view of the assumptions described in the previous section, our privacy attacker boils down to an entity
that aims to profile users by representing their interests in the form of normalised histograms, on the basis
of a given categorisation. To achieve this objective, the attacker exploits the tags that users communicate
to social tagging systems. This work assumes that users are willing to submit false tags, to mitigate the
risk of profiling. In doing so, users gain some privacy, although at the cost of certain loss in usability. As
a result of this, the attacker observes a perturbed version of the genuine user profile, also in the form of a
relative histogram, which does not reflect the actual interests of the user. In short, the attacker believes
that the observed behaviour characterises the actual user’s profile.
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Thereafter, we shall refer to these two profiles as the actual user profile p and the apparent user profile t.
3.2. Privacy Metric
In this section, we propose and justify an information-theoretic quantity as a measure of user privacy in
social tagging systems. For the readers not familiar with information theory, next we briefly review two key
concepts.
Recall [25] that Shannon’s entropy H(p) of a discrete random variable (r.v.) with PMF p = (pi)
L
i=1 on
the alphabet {1, . . . , L} is a measure of the uncertainty of the outcome of this r.v., defined as
H(p) = −
∑
pi log pi.
Given two probability distributions p and q over the same alphabet, the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence
is defined as
D(p ‖ q) =
∑
pi log
pi
qi
.
The KL divergence is often referred to as relative entropy, as it may be regarded as a generalisation of the
Shannon entropy of a distribution, relative to another.
Having reviewed the concepts of entropy and relative entropy, we define the initial privacy risk as the
KL divergence between the user’s genuine profile p and the population’s tag distribution p¯, that is,
R0 = D(p ‖ p¯).
Similarly, we define the (final) privacy risk R as the KL divergence between the user’s apparent profile t
and the population’s distribution,
R = D(t ‖ p¯).
Next, we justify the Shannon entropy and the KL divergence as measures of privacy when an attacker
aims to individuate users based on their tag profiles. The rationale behind the use of these two information-
theoretic quantities as privacy metrics is documented in greater detail in [4].
Leveraging on a celebrated information-theoretic rationale by Jaynes [26], the Shannon entropy of an
apparent user profile may be regarded as a measure of privacy, or more accurately, anonymity. The leading
idea is that the method of types from information theory establishes an approximate monotonic relationship
between the likelihood of a PMF in a stochastic system and its entropy. Loosely speaking and in our context,
the higher the entropy of a profile, the more likely it is, and the more users behave according to it. Under
this interpretation, entropy is a measure of anonymity, although not in the sense that the user’s identity
remains unknown. Entropy has, therefore, the meaning that the higher likelihood of an apparent profile can
help the user go unnoticed. In fact, the apparent user profile makes the user more typical to an external
observer, and hopefully, less attractive to an attacker whose objective is to target peculiar users.
If an aggregated histogram of the population is available as a reference profile, as we assume in this
work, the extension of Jaynes’ argument to relative entropy also gives an acceptable measure of anonymity.
The KL divergence is a measure of discrepancy between probability distributions, which includes Shannon’s
entropy as the particular case when the reference distribution is uniform. Conceptually, a lower KL diver-
gence hides discrepancies with respect to a reference profile, say the population’s profile. Also, it exists
a monotonic relationship between the likelihood of a distribution and its divergence with respect to the
reference distribution of choice. This aspect enables us to deem KL divergence as a measure of anonymity
in a sense entirely analogous to the above mentioned.
Under this interpretation, the KL divergence is, therefore, interpreted as an (inverse) indicator of the
commonness of similar profiles in said population. As such, we should hasten to stress that the KL divergence
is a measure of anonymity rather than privacy. The obfuscated information is the uniqueness of the profile
behind the online activity, rather than the actual profile. Indeed, a profile of interests already matching the
population’s would not require perturbation.
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3.3. Privacy-Enhancing Techniques
Among a variety of PETs, this work focuses on those technologies that rely on the principle of tag forgery.
The key strengths of such tag-perturbation technique are its simplicity in terms of infrastructure requirements
and its strong privacy guarantees, as users need not trust the social tagging platform, nor the network
operator nor other peers.
In conceptual terms, tag forgery is a PET that may help users tagging online resources to protect their
privacy. It consists of the simple idea that users may be willing to tag items that are unknown to them and
that do not reflect their actual preferences, in order to appear as similar as possible to the average population
profile. A simple example of such technique can be illustrated by thinking to a specific thematic community,
such that of a group of individuals interested in jazz music. In this scenario if a user is particularly interested
in rock music, their profile could be easily spotted and identified, as they would probably express interest
towards artists and tracks that could be categorised outside of the jazz category.
When a user wishes to apply tag forgery, first they must specify a tag-forgery rate ρ ∈ [0, 1]. This rate
represents the ratio of forged tags to total tags the user is disposed to submit. Based on this parameter and
exactly as in [2], we define the user’s apparent tag profile as the convex combination t = (1−ρ) p+ρ r. Here
r is some forgery strategy modeling the percentage of tags that the user should forge in each tag category.
Clearly, any forgery strategy must satisfy that ri > 0 for all i and that
∑
ri = ρ.
In this work, we consider three different forgery strategies, which result in three implementations of tag
forgery, namely, optimised tag forgery [2], the popular TMN mechanism [3] and a uniform tag forgery. The
optimised tag forgery corresponds to choosing the strategy r∗ that minimises privacy risk for a given ρ, that
is,
r∗ = arg min
r
D((1− ρ) p+ ρ r ‖ p¯).
Please note that this formulation of optimised tag forgery relies on the appropriateness of the criteria
optimised, which in turn depends on a number of factors. These are: the specific application scenario
and the tag statistics of the users; the actual network and processing over-head incurred by introducing
forged tags; the assumption that the tag-forgery rate ρ is a faithful representation of the degradation in
recommendation quality; the adversarial model and the mechanisms against privacy contemplated.
The TMN mechanism is described next. Said mechanism is a software implementation of query forgery
developed as a Web browser add-on. It exploits the idea of generating false queries to a search engine
in order to avoid user profiling from the latter. TMN is designed as a client-side software, specifically a
browser add-on, independent from centralised infrastructure or third-party services for its operation. In the
client software, a mechanism defined dynamic query lists has been implemented. Each instance of TMN
is programmed to create an initial seed list of query terms that will be used to compute the first flow of
decoys searches. The initial list of keywords is built from a set of RSS feeds from popular websites, mainly
news sites, and it is combined with a second list of popular query words gathered from recently searched
terms. When TMN is first enabled, and the user sends an actual search query, TMN intercepts the HTTP
response returned from the search engine, and extracts suitable query-like terms that will be used to create
the forged searches. Furthermore, the provided list of RSS feeds is queried randomly to substitute keywords
in the list of seeds [27].
Because TMN sends arbitrary keywords as search queries, the user profile resulting from this forgery
strategy is completely random [28]. Although the user possess the ability to add or remove RSS feeds that the
extension will use to construct their bogus queries, there is no possible way to control which actual keywords
are chosen. Moreover, the user has no control on the random keywords that are included in the bursts of
bogus queries, since these are extracted from the HTTP response received from the actual searches that the
user has performed. While TMN is a technique designed to forge search queries, we have have implemented
a TMN-like agent generating bogus tags. To initialise our TMN-like agent we have considered an initial list
of seed using RSS feeds from popular news sites, the sites included were the same ones that TMN uses in
its built-in list of feeds. By querying the RSS feeds, a list of keywords was extracted. Hence, using the
extracted keywords a distribution of tags into eleven categories was constructed, these eleven categories
corresponds to the first taxonomy levels of the Open Directory Project (ODP) classification scheme [29].
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Table 1: Summary of the tag-forgery strategies under study. In this work, we investigate three variations of a data-perturbative
mechanism that consists of annotating false tags. The optimised tag forgery implementation corresponds to the strategy that
minimises the privacy risk for a given forgery rate. The TMN-like approach generates false tags according to the popular
privacy-preserving mechanism TrackMeNot [3]. The uniform approach considers the uniform distribution as forgery strategy.
Tag-forgery implementation Forgery strategy r
Optimised [2] arg minr D((1− ρ) p+ ρ r ‖ p¯)
TMN [3] w (TMN distribution)
Uniform u (uniform distribution)
The profile obtained with this technique has then been assumed as a reference to implement a TMN agent
and is denoted by the distribution w.
Last but not least, the proposed uniform tag forgery strategy is constructed similarly to TMN. We have in
fact supposed a TMN agent that would send disguise tags created according to a uniform distribution across
all categories. More specifically, in the uniform forgery strategy we have that r = u. Table 1 summarises
the tag-forgery strategies considered here.
3.4. Similarity Metric
A recommender, or a recommendation system, can be described as an information filtering system that seeks
to predict the rating or preference that a user would give to an item. For the purpose of our study, the idea
of rating a resource or expressing a preference has been considered as the action of tagging an item. This
assumption follows the idea that a user will most likely tag a resource if they happen to be interested in this
resource.
In the field of recommendations systems, we may distinguish three main approaches to item recom-
mendation: content-based, user-based and collaborative filtering [30]. In content-based filtering items are
compared based on a measure of similarity. The assumption behind this strategy is that items similar to
those a user has already tagged in the past would be considered more relevant by the individual in question.
If in fact a user has been tagging resources in certain categories with more frequency, it is more probable
that they would also annotate items belonging to the same categories.
In user-based filtering, users are compared with other users based again on a defined measure of similarity.
It is supposed, in this case, that if two or more users have similar interests, i.e. they have been expressing
preference in resources in similar categories, items that are useful for one of them can also be significant for
the others.
Collaborative filtering employs both a combination of the techniques described before as well as the
collective actions of a group or network of users and their social relationships [31]. In collaborative filtering
then, not only the tags and categories that have been attached to a certain items are considered, but also
what are called item-specific metadata are taken into account, these could be the item title or summary, or
other content-related information [32].
In the coming sections, we shall use a generic content-based filtering algorithm [33] to evaluate the three
variations of tag forgery described in Section 3.3.
We have chosen a content-based recommender because this class of algorithms models users and items
as histograms of tags, which is essentially the model assumed for our adversary 3.1. Loosely speaking
a content-based recommendation system is composed of: a proper techniques for representing the items
and users’ profiles, a strategy to compare items and users and produce a recommendation. The field
of content recommendation is particularly vast and developed in the literature and its applications are
numerous. Recommendation systems in fact span different topics in computer science, information retrieval
and artificial intelligence.
For the scope of this job we are only concentrating on applying a suitable measure of similarity within
items and users’ profiles. The recommendation algorithm we have implemented therefore aims to find items
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that are closer to a particular user profile (i.e. more similar). Three commons measurement of similarity
between objects are usually considered in the literature. These are namely: Euclidean distance, Pearson
correlation and Cosine similarity [34].
The Euclidean distance is the simplest and most common example of a distance measure. The Pearson
correlation is instead a measurement of the linear relationship between objects. While there are certainly
different correlation coefficients that have been considered and applied, the Pearson correlation is among
the most commonly used.
Cosine similarity is another very common approach. It considers items as document vectors of an n-
dimensional space and compute their similarity as the cosine of the angle that they form. We have applied
this approach in our study.
More specifically, we have considered a cosine-based similarity [35] as a measure of distance between a
user profile and an item profile. The cosine metric is a simple and robust measure of similarity between
vectors which is widely used in content-based recommenders. Hence if pm = (pm,1, . . . , pm,L) is the profile
of user um and qn = (qn,1, . . . , qn,L) is the profile of item in, the cosine similarity between these two profiles
is defined as
s(pm, qn) =
∑
l pm,l qn,l√∑
l p
2
m,l
√∑
l q
2
n,l
.
3.5. Utility Metric
A utility metric is being introduced in order to evaluate the performances of the recommender and understand
how these degrade with the application of a specific PET. Prediction accuracy is among the most debated
property in the literature regarding recommendation systems. For the purpose of this work it is assumed
that a system providing on average more accurate recommendation of items would be preferred by the user.
Furthermore the system is evaluated considering a content retrieval scenario where a user is provided with
a ranked list of N recommended items, hence performances are evaluated in terms of ranking based metrics
used in the Information Retrieval field of study [36] . The performance metric adopted is therefore among
the most commonly used for ranked list prediction, i.e. precision at top V results. In the field of information
retrieval, precision can be defined as the fraction of recommended items that are relevant for a target user [37]
. If the recommendation system evaluated retrieves V items, the previously defined ratio is precision at top
V or P@V. Precision at top V is then a metric that measures how many relevant documents the user will
find in the ranked list of results. The overall performance value is then calculated by averaging the results
over the set of all available users. Considering a likely scenario, for which a user would be presented with a
list of top-V results that the system has considered most similar to their profile, we have evaluated precision
of the recommender in two possible situations: with V = 30 in one case and V = 50 in the other.
4. Architecture
In this section, we present an architecture of a communication module for the protection of user profiles
in social tagging systems (Figure 2). We consider the case in which a user would retrieve items from a
social tagging platform, and would occasionally submit annotations in the form of ratings or tags to the
resource they would find interesting. This would be the case of a user browsing resources on StumbleUpon,
tagging bookmarks on Delicious or exploring photos on Flickr. The social tagging platform would suggest
web resources through its recommendation system that would gradually learn about the user interest, hence
trying to suggest items more related to the user expressed preferences.
While the user would normally read the suggested documents, these would also be intercepted by the
communication module, running as a software on the user space. This can be imagined as a browser extension
analysing the communication between the user and the social tagging platform under consideration.
More generally, the communication module can be envisioned as a proxy or a firewall, i.e. a component
between the user and the outside internet, responsible for filtering and managing the communication flows
that the user generates. While the user would browse the internet the communication module would be in
sleeping mode, and it could be turned on at the user’s discretion only when visiting certain social tagging
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platforms. It is assumed that while the user would surf a certain platform, eventually annotating resources
that they find relevant, they would receive and generate a stream of data, or more specifically a data flow.
This is composed of the resources that the platform is sending to the user in the form of recommendation
and of those that the user is sending back to the platform in the form of tagged items.
These data flows are analysed in the communication module by a component, the population profile
constructor, and used to build a population profile of reference. We have supposed that these data streams
would probably contain annotations that would help the module profiling the average population of users,
together with other information regarding trends and current news. It is also possible that the module would
contain specific, pre-compiled profiles, corresponding to particular population that the user would consider
either safe or generic.
The user generated stream of data instead, composed by each annotated item, would be feeding the user
profile constructor. This component would keep track of the actual expressed user preferences and feed this
data into the forgery controller.
At this point the forgery controller would calculate a forgery strategy, that at the user discretion is either
applied or not to the stream of tagged resources, and that would be sent to the social tagging platform, as
the flow of data comprising the user activity. If the user kept the communication module on its off state,
no forgery would modify the documents sent to the social tagging service, otherwise a certain stream of
annotations would be computed and applied to certain resources.
This means that according to the strategy and a forgery rate that the user has chosen, the forgery
controller would produce a number of bogus tags to certain items. These would be sent to the social tagging
platform together with the actual user annotations. The user would hence present to the platform not their
real profile, but an apparent profile t resulting from both their real activity and the forged categorisation
stream.
Figure 2: The proposed architecture of a communication module managing the user data flows with a social tagging platform
and implementing different possible forgery algorithms.
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4.1. Further considerations
We would like to stress the fact that at the centre of our approach is the user. The communication module
can in fact be used either to calculate a forgery strategy, or to simply warn the user when their privacy risk
reaches a certain threshold. At this point the user would be presented with a possible forgery strategy and
eventually are set of keywords and resources that could be used to produce bogus tags. We are aware that
a mechanism generating tags could eventually produce a strategy introducing sensible topics in the user
profile. We have, therefore, addressed this situation by using exclusively a curated list of websites and news
portals whose content can be considered safe. In addition keywords in categories considered sensible could
be excluded, either automatically or by the users. In our architecture is the user who ultimately decides
whether to follow the recommendations proposed by our communication module or not.
Additionally, it is worth mentioning that, if the user decided to reduce excessively the number of cat-
egories used to produce a possible forgery strategy, their user profile would inevitably exhibits a spike in
activity in the chosen categories. As a consequence, the apparent user profile would probably become more
identifiable to an external attacker. We therefore believe that although the user should be allowed to tweak
their forgery strategy, they should also be informed of the consequences of applying some settings instead
of others to the communication module.
We have also considered the possibility to implement our proposed architecture as a mobile application.
We are aware this might add a computational, and networking overhead on the platform where the module
will be installed, yet we also believe that in modern mobile platforms and personal computers this shall
not be an issue. More importantly we believe that the benefit of controlling the user perceived profile shall
overcome the cost of implementing the proposed architecture.
Profile data are in fact collected not only by social tagging platforms but also by websites, web appli-
cations and third parties even when the user is not connected to a personal account. Through tracking
technologies and a networks of affiliated web sites users can be followed online and their footprint collected
for a variety of uses. If aggregated, these data could reveal more over time that the same users initially
intended. The data then turn from merely figures to piece of information able to describe users’ identity
and behaviours. Social engineering attacks could exploit users’ profiles on different social networks to gather
certain sensitive information. Similarly users’ profiles crawling across different services and applications can
disclose relevant facts about the users. It is, therefore, important for users to maintain a desired online
privacy strategy. At the same time, this approach could also be implemented by developers and systems
architects who need to be aware of the possible privacy and security implication of their work.
5. Evaluation
Evaluating how a recommender system would be affected when tag forgery is applied in a real world scenario
is interesting for a different range of applications. We have particularly considered both the point of view
of the privacy researcher interested in understanding how user privacy can be preserved, and also the
perspective of an application developer willing to provide users with accurate recommendation regarding
content and resources available on their platform.
Every PET must in fact ensure whether the semantic loss incurred in order to protect private data can
be acceptable for practical use.
Thus, different tag forgery strategies were considered in a scenario where all the users were willing to
apply the techniques. It was also considered that a user would try to apply a certain technique at different
forgery rates, in order to evaluate how utility would be affected on average at each rate. When forgery rate
is equal to zero it means the technique is not applied.
Hence, the overall utility for the recommender system, based on the applied forgery rate was evaluated
against the privacy risk reduction calculated after each step.
In our simulated scenario, a user would ideally implement a possible PET at a time. We have therefore
considered what percentage of utility the hypothetical user would lose when incrementing the ratio of forged
tags with each strategy, consequently underlining what percentage of privacy risk reduction has gained in
front of a certain loss in utility.
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Figure 3: Experimental methodology.
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(a) Privacy risk R against forgery rate ρ for all users.
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(b) Privacy risk R against forgery rate ρ for a single user.
Figure 4: For the optimised forgery strategy the privacy risk R decreases with ρ. Naturally for ρ = 0 the privacy risk for all the
users applying a technique is actually maximum, while it will approach 0% when ρ = 1. The graph shows how the optimised
tag forgery strategy allows users to reduce more rapidly their privacy risk even for small values or ρ. This confirms the intuitive
assumption that applying a forgery strategy that actually modifies the user’s apparent profile to increase its divergence from
the average population profile, would produce the unfavourable result to make the user activity more easily recognised from a
possible passive observer.
Table 2: Statistics regarding Delicious dataset
Statistics about the built dataset
Categories 11 Users 1867
Item-Category Tuples 98998 Avg. Tags per User 477.75
Items 69226 Avg. Items per Category 81044
Avg. Categories per Item 1.4 Tags per item 13.06
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Figure 5: Average value of utility P@ calculated for different values of ρ, representing how applying a certain tag forgery
strategy with a determined forgery rate affects the performance of a recommendation system, hence the user utility function.
It is important to note that the measure of utility averaged across the user population is affected by statistical noise creating
some glitches in the function that we can see attenuated if presenting each user with a larger list of results to choose from.
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Figure 6: It is interesting to note the ratio between the privacy risk R and the utility loss only for small values of ρ.
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Figure 7: Actual number of users increasing their privacy risk as a side effect of applying a certain strategy for a given value
of ρ.
The user in this setup is presented over time with a list of top results, they would then decide to
click or not on a number of these resources. This number divided by the total number of results gives us
the percentage of items that the user has actually found interesting. Our utility metric is then evaluated
considering the cases for which the user has been presented with the top 30 results, and the top 50 results.
Note that since in our experimental setting, we have split the data into a testing and a training set [5, 38],
considering relevant only the items in the user’s profile, it is not possible to evaluate items that are as yet
unknown to the user but that could also be considered relevant (Figure 3). In a real world application in
fact, a user could be presented with results that are unknown to them, but that do reflect their expressed
interestes. Therefore our estimation of precision is in fact an underestimation [39].
In order to evaluate the impact of a determined PET on the quality of the recommendation, and elaborate
a study of the relationship between privacy and utility, a dataset rich in collaborative tagging information was
needed. Considering different social bookmarking platforms, Delicious was identified as a representative sys-
tem. Delicious is a social bookmarking platform for web resources [1]. The dataset containing Delicious data
was obtained from the ones publicly available at the 2nd International Workshop on Information Heterogene-
ity and Fusion in Recommender Systems [40], accessible on http://ir.ii.uam.es/hetrec2011/datasets.html,
and kindly hosted by GroupLens research group at University of Minnesota. Furthermore, the dataset also
contained category information about their items, this corresponds to the first and second taxonomy levels
of the ODP classification scheme (Table 2) [29]. The ODP project, now DMOZ, is the largest, most compre-
hensive human-edited directory of the Web, constructed and maintained by a passionate, global community
of volunteers editors.
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The chosen dataset specifically contains activity on the most popular tags in Delicious, the bookmarks
tagged with those tags, and the users that tagged each bookmark. Starting from this specific set of users,
the dataset also exhibits their contacts and contacts’ contacts activity. Therefore it both covers a broad
range of document?s topics while also presenting a dense social network [29].
The experimental methodology is described also by Figure 3. The dataset is randomly divided between
two subsets, namely a testing and a training set. The training set contains 80% of the items for each user,
and was used to build the users’ profiles. The testing set contained the remaining 20% of the items tagged
by each user, and was considered to evaluate (test) the recommender itself.
The first step of the experiment involved obtaining a metric of the recommender performance without
applying any PET. The recommender would then produce estimation of how relevant an item potentially is
for a user, by comparing the calculated user profile with each profile of the items in the testing set. This step
would return a list of top items for each user. At this point our precision metric is calculated by verifying
which of the top V items have actually being tagged by each user. This process is repeated at each value of ρ
to understand how applying a different PET affects the prediction performances of a simple recommendation
system. Please note that the three different PET have been considered independently for one another, i.e.
the users would apply one of the techniques at a time and not a strategy involving a combination of the
three.
5.1. Experimental results
In our experimental setup, we have firstly evaluated what level of privacy users will reach implementing each
of the strategies considered. Figure 4a shows how the application of the different PETs at different values
of ρ affect the privacy risk R.
The first interesting result can be observed by considering how the privacy risk R is affected by the
application of a certain PET. For values of ρ ∈ [0, 0.25] (Figure 6a), R is decreasing for all three strategies,
although with optimised forgery this seem to be happening faster.
When larger values of ρ are considered, the apparent user profile will most likely mimic the profile of
either the population distribution, in the case of optimised forgery, the TMN distribution in the case of
TMN and the uniform distribution in the case of uniform forgery. If we consider this apparent effect, we
understand why, while the privacy risk approaches 0 in the case of optimised forgery, it actually increases
both for TMN and uniform forgery (Figure 4a). Recalling that our privacy metric, and adversary model,
consider the case for which a possible attacker would try to isolate a certain user from the rest of the
population, applying a forgery strategy that would generate an apparent profile t that would increase the
divergence from an average profile, would actually result in making the user more easily identified from a
possible observer.
This undesirable consequence is also more eloquently present when applying the uniform strategy, in fact
as the user apparent profile approached the uniform distribution for higher values of ρ, it would become
evident to an external observer which users are forging their tags according to this strategy.
In the case of optimised forgery instead, privacy risk decreases with ρ. Naturally for ρ = 0 the privacy
risk for all the users applying a technique is actually maximum, while it will approach 0% when ρ = 1. It
is particularly interesting to see how our optimised tag forgery strategy allows users to reduce their privacy
risk more rapidly even for small values or ρ.
We have therefore measured the total number of users that would actually increase their privacy risk
as a consequence of having applied a certain PET (Figures 7). It is surprisingly striking to observe how
almost 90% of the total number of users, when applying TMN or uniform forgery, would make their apparent
profile more recognisable than without implementing any PET. This reflects the intuitive assumption that
in order to conceal the actual user’s profile, with the privacy metric considered throughout this work, it
would be advisable to make it as close as possible to an average profile of reference, so that it is not possible
to individuate it, or in other words to distinguish it from the average population profile.
We then have evaluated how our utility metric was affected by the application of the tag forgery strategies,
for different values of ρ. We have considered two situations to evaluate our utility metric. In the first case
the user would be presented with the top 30 results, and in the second with the top 50. This allowed us,
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not only to evaluate the impact of noise on the metric itself, but also to consider the impact of a certain
strategy over longer series of results.
Figure 5b and Figure 5a, shows the obtained utility versus the rate of tag forgery applied, this has been
evaluated again for optimised forgery, uniform forgery, and TMN strategy, in order to understand how these
PETs perform in the described scenario.
In this case we noticed how a uniform forgery strategy, which generates bogus tags according to a uniform
distribution across all categories, is able to better preserve utility than either optimised tag forgery or TMN,
especially for bigger forgery ratios.
What we found particularly relevant in our study is that for smaller values of ρ, hence for a forgery
rate up to 0.1, corresponding to a user forging 10% of their tags, our optimised forgery strategy shows a
privacy risk reduction R of almost 34% opposed to a degradation in utility of 8%. This result is particularly
representative of the intuition that it is possible to obtain a considerable increase in privacy, with a modest
degradation of performance of the recommender system, or in other words a limited utility loss (Figure 6b).
The results obtained therefore present a scenario where applying a tag forgery technique perturbs the
profile observed from the outside, thus enabling users to protect their privacy, in exchange of a small
semantic loss if compared to the privacy risk reduction. The performance degradation measured for the
recommendation systems, is small if compared to the privacy risk reduction obtained by the user when
applying the forgery strategy considered.
6. Conclusions
Information filtering systems that have been developed to predict users’ preferences, and eventually use the
resulting predictions for different services, depend on users revealing their personal preferences by annotating
items that are relevant to them. At the same time, by revealing their preferences online users are exposed
to possible privacy attacks and all sorts of profiling activities by legitimate and less legitimate entities.
Query forgery arises, among different possible PETs, as a simple strategy in terms of infrastructure re-
quirements, as no third parties or external entities need to be trusted by the user in order to be implemented.
However, query forgery poses a trade-off between privacy and utility. Measuring utility by computing
the list of useful results that a user would receive from a recommendation system, we have evaluated how
three possible tag forgery techniques would perform in a social tag application. With this in mind a dataset
for a real world application, rich in collaborative tagging information has been considered.
Delicious provided a playground to calculate how the performance of a recommendation system would
be affected if all the users implemented a tag forgery strategy. We have hence considered an adversary
model where a passive privacy attacker is trying to profile a certain user. The user in response, adopts a
privacy strategy aiming at concealing their actual preferences, minimising the divergence with the average
population profile. The results presented show a compelling outcome regarding how implementing different
PETs can affect both user privacy risk, as well as the overall recommendation utility.
We have firstly observed how while the privacy risk R decreases initially, for smaller values of ρ (for both
TMN and uniform forgery), it increases as bigger forgery ratios are considered. This is because the implied
techniques actually modify the apparent user profile to increase its divergence from the average population
profile. This actually makes the user activity more easily recognised from a possible passive observer. On
the other hand, optimised forgery has been designed to minimise the divergence between the user and the
population profile, therefore the effect described is not observed in this case.
Considering this unfavourable effect, we have computed the number of users that would actually increase
their privacy risk. This particular result showed how applying a certain PET could actually be detrimental
to the user’s privacy: if the user implemented a strategy that is not accurately chosen, they would be exposed
to a higher privacy risk than the one measured before applying the PET. Observing how the application of
a PET affects utility, we have found out that especially for a small forgery rate (up to 20%) it is possible
to obtain a consistent increase in privacy, or privacy risk reduction, against a small degradation of utility.
This reflects the intuition that users would be able to receive personalised services while also being able to
reasonably protect their privacy and their profiles from possible attackers.
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This study furthermore shows in a simple experimental evaluation, of a real world application scenario,
how the performances degradation of a recommendation system, is small if compared to the privacy risk
reduction offered by the application of these techniques. This opens many possibilities and paths that need
to be explored to better understand the relationship between privacy and utility in recommendation systems.
In particular it would be interesting to explore other definitions of the metrics proposed and apply these on
different class of recommendation systems.
As future research lines, we shall investigate how other information filtering models are affected by the
application of certain PET. Specifically we shall consider researching how different aspects of users’ activities
are categorised and profiled by information filtering systems, and what counter-measures can be taken to
protect user privacy.
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